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Dialectic Relation between Foreign Policy and Russian National Identity 
 
Dina Moulioukova
 
 
 
People do not have to wish to be “like     
others”.  
They have to wish to be like themselves. 
      Pietr Savitskii 
 
Know thyself 
                                              Socrates 
 
The first rule we have to follow is that 
of national character: every people has, 
or must have, a character: if it lacks one, 
we must start by endowing it with one.
 1 
    Jean-Jacque Rousseau 
 
Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to prove empirically that international relations and national identity are 
two interconnected and interdependent phenomena.  The argument presented here is twofold. In 
the first part of the argument this paper will demonstrate how external factors such as relations 
with foreign states can influence shifts in the sense of national identity of a state. In the second 
part  it  would  argue  that  national  identity  shaped  by  the  international  relations  system 
subsequently affects the international system itself through a state’s behavior. This analysis will 
be  exhibited  empirically  on  the  example  of  Russia  through  presentation  of  various 
transformations  that  Russia’s  national  identity  underwent  after  the  end  of  Cold  War  due  to 
external factors.  
I will start my analysis by presenting various definitions that are crucial to understanding 
the argument such as notions of national identity and the international relations system. Then I 
will proceed to the study of the complex nature of Russian national identity and an understanding 
of Russian Creed, as well as different schools inside Russia that have distinct views on what 
Russian  identity  is.  Following  I  will  analyze  how  particular  foreign  factors  influenced  and 
continue influencing various shifts in Russian identity after the end of Cold War. Among these 
factors I will analyze firstly, different stages of the relations between Russia and the West, and 
how  such  relations  influenced  shifts  in  construction  of  national  identity  inside  Russia;  and 
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1 C. E. Vaughan, The political writings of Rousseau, Cambridge, p.319  
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secondly, I will summarize briefly how other factors in the international system, such as changes 
in the balance of power and rise of China affect the Russian Creed. As a part of my analysis I will 
also demonstrate empirically how Russian behavior as an international actor can be explained in 
different periods from the position Russian Federation takes on its national identity.  
 
Definitions 
There is an array of definitions on what constitutes nation, nationalism and national identity. 
These terms are closely connected. For the purpose of this analysis I will employ the following 
definitions. The definition of a nation will be used as a socially mobilized group that wants 
political self-determination
2. In the case of Russia though, I would be ref erring to all ethnic 
groups and nationalities that reside on the territory of Russia as a state as Russian nation 
(Rossiiskii narod) rather than purely Russian ethnic group (Russkii narod). When referring to 
nationalism I will be employing the definition o f this term by Kaufman as a belief that socially 
mobilized group should be politically autonomous and take its rightful place among the nations of 
the world.
3  Barrington Moore, Jr. according to Ilya Prizel introduces the simplest and thus the 
broadest explanation of national identity, the cornerstone of nationalism
4, as a membership in a 
group that can save an individual from anxieties of carving out his own meaningful place in the 
world, especially when the realistic chances of doing so are tiny
5.  
There are a few observations of national identity that are worth making. The first is that 
national identity is subject to constant redefinitions. Even though the process of such redefinitions 
is mostly gradual, under the situations of stress such identities can  be changed at an accelerated 
rate and people’s collective memories can be rearranged quickly.
6 The second is that sources of 
national identity are unique to each nation
7 and are subject to constant social construction. Such 
social construction is highly subjective. It is determined by who serves as the custodian of the 
collective memory of a polity. Since memory is highly selective it is a custodian who determines 
how this memory is shaped. It is important to note that the change of custodian of national 
identity brings along the change in perceptions of the past and, as a result, the parameters of 
national identity and national interest.
8  
Lastly, national identity reflects a nation’s relationship to “the other”, its relations to the 
outside world.
9 National identity is an outgrowth of contact between distinct groups. However 
this relation to the “other” is mostly prominent in some parts of the world, such as Russia and 
Central and Eastern Europe, and less obvious in another, as can be seen on the example of 
English and American self-identification. While in English and American identification systems 
are  mostly  self-contained,  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europeans  identify  with  ideals  almost 
universally determined by the rejection of “the other”.
10 Therefore the relations that some states 
have with other states have strong dialectical relation to the formation of their national identity.
11  
To truly understand how international relations and national identity influence each other, 
it is imperative to introduce some  notions of international relations system as well. Firstly, the 
prominent scholar of realist school Hans Morgenthau broadly defined international politics as 
                                                            
2 Stuart J. Kaufman, They symbolic politics of ethnic war, Itacha: Cornell University Press, p. 16 
3 Ibid 
4 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.8 
5 Barrington Moore Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, New York: M.E. Sharpe, p. 
488 
6 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.8 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid, p 35 
9 Ibid, p 8 
10 Ibid, p 26 
11 Ibid  
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political relations among nations and institutions
12. Among most important factors of political 
behavior and international politics he asserted the struggle for power.
13 The essence of power for 
Morgenthau is in the relations between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. 
Therefore power gives the former control over certain actions  of the latter through the influence 
which  the  former  exert  over  the  latter’s  mind.
14  To  expand  on  the  notion  of  power  Henry 
Kissinger,  along  with  other  scholars,  notes  that  balance  of  power  among  the  states  is  prime 
determinant  of  state’s  behavior  internationally.
15  Under  balance  of  power  Morgenthau 
understands for the most part the notion of equilibrium. This equilibrium of power among states 
is necessary for maintaining stability inside the international relations system. In absence of such 
equilibrium in international system one element (state) will gain ascendancy over the others, 
encroach upon their interests and rights, and ultimately destroy them.
16  Therefore shifts and 
changes in balance of power can determine largely state’s perception of the threat to its interests 
and rights and subsequently can affect state’s behavior as an international actor. 
The other important aspect of foreign policy is in the notion of its presumed rationality.  
As noted by Morgenthau only rational foreign policy can be considered a good foreign policy, 
due to its ability to minimize the risks and maximize the benefits.
17 Therefore, psychological 
aspects of foreign policy, such as national identity, have been often overlooked by some scholars 
due to their subjective and irrationa l nature. However, as been noted by Max Weber some 
societies craft their foreign policy in desire to satisfy “irrational” psychological needs instead of 
rational notions of security or economy.
18 As further noted by William Bloom “identification 
theory”, as a psychological bond that motivates and entire population to support certain external 
policies even if they cause a great deal of social pain and bring few visible rewards, can be 
studied as an important element in understanding of foreign policy.
19 Therefore national identity, 
as previously defined by Barrington Moore, as manifestation of nation’s identification can serve 
as an important lens to understanding some state’s international behavior, despite its seemingly 
irrational nature. 
 
Issues of Russian Identity 
Russia serves as an example of such a state where national identity might provide insights into 
understanding Russian foreign policy. As noted by Regina Heller in her manuscript “Subjectivity 
Matters:  Reconsidering  Russia’s  Relations  with  the  West”
20  from  the  Western  point  of  view 
Russia’s attitude in its foreign policy appear largely inconsistent and illogical. Russia’s behavior 
as  an  international  actor  is  characterized  by  swings  that  contradict  the  current  trends  and 
dynamics of engagements this makes Russian foreign policy at times highly unpredictable. Heller 
argues however that psychological aspects that are basic to human decision making should also 
be applied to the international realm and fill in the gaps left by conventional interpretations of 
Russian foreign policy by “realpolitik”
21 The author adds that an explanation to Russian foreign 
                                                            
12 Hanz Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, the struggle for power and piece, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, p 14 
13 Hanz Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, the struggle for power and piece, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf 
14 Ibid p. 27 
15 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994 
16 Hanz Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, the struggle for power and piece, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, p. 156-157 
17 Ibid, p 7 
18Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.15 
19 Ibid 
20 Unpublished manuscript by Regina Heller “Subjectivity Matters: Reconsidering Russia’s Relations with 
the West” was kindly provided by Professor Kanet 
21 Ibid  
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behavior might be found in different irrational factors such as honor, recognition, perceptions, 
images  and  historic  experiences
22. In my opinion most of thes e factors can be perceived as 
components of national identity. 
Unlike the clarity of the American Creed as defined by Anatol Liven in his book 
“America Right or Wrong” that includes such elements as faith in liberty, constitutionalism, the 
law, democracy, individualism, cultural and political egalitarism,
23 the notion of Russian identity 
seems to be surprisingly conflicting and ambiguous, and yet  haunting for intellectuals and 
scholars alike. As noted by James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress and origin ator of two 
major  Russian-American  bipartisan  initiatives  in  Congress,  no  nation  has  invested  more 
intellectual energy in search of its national identity than Russia
24.   
Different scholars, Russian and foreign alike, have distinct views on what comprises 
Russian national identity. In 1902 Member of British Parliament, Henry Norman, published a 
book titled “All the Russians: Travels and Studies in Contemporary European Russia, Finland, 
Siberia, the Caucuses, and Central Asia” – the result as he claimed of over fifteen years’ interest 
in Russian affairs and a few journeys to Russia. To the question on “what is Russia?” Norman 
gives a surprisingly ambiguous answer by asserting that “it would be easier to say what is not 
Russia”
25.  Former  Russian  Ambassador  to  the  United  States,  Vladimir  Lukin,  in  giving  his 
definition of Russian identity provided an equally confusing response by stating that Russia is 
less a choice than a fate.
26 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn proceeds with the notion that national identity 
in the case of Russia is not determined by blood or geographical boundaries, but rather by spirit 
or consciousness, and whoever belongs to such spirit and culture by consciousness are Russians.
27 
According to Andrei Tsygankov in his manuscript “Honor in International Relations: Russia and 
the West from Alexander to Putin” the key to understanding Russian identity lies in the sense of 
national honor that determines Russia’s behavior as international actor. Tsygankov’s definition of 
Russian identity is of moral nature as well, since he introduces honor as a moral value that is 
associated with readiness of Self to preserve its dignity and assume moral commitments to the 
relevant social community.
28 
Along with almost metaphysical notions of Russian identity noted above, some sc holars 
provide a more objective classification of different approaches to understanding the essence of 
Russian Creed. Ilya Pritzel groups ideas on Russian national identity in the following categories. 
The first group is linked to the notion of Russia as an empire. There are conflicting views inside 
this group. The first view advocates that Russia will not retain its integrity without at least a 
partial resurrection of the empire.
29 The second, alternatively, states that dissolution of the empire 
has a liberating effect on Russia and will allow it to become a normal nation that pursues its own 
national interest rather than imperial demands.
30  The other group of analysts, like Tatyana 
Tolstaya, argues that there are not one but several distinct Russian identiti es and that it is 
                                                            
22 Ibid 
23 Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 49  
24 James H. Billington, Russia in Search of itself, Woodraw Wilson Center Press, John Hopkins University 
Press, p.12 
25 Simon Franklin and Emma Widdis, All the Russia…?, in Simon Franklin and Emma Widdis “National 
Identity in Russian Culture”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1  
26 Wayne Allensworth, The Russian Question, Nationalism, Modernization, and Post-Communist 
Russia,Lanham, MD/New York/Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, p. xi 
27 Russkiy Vopros, 174 
28 Unpublished manuscript by Andrei P. Tsygankov “Honor in International Relations: Russia and the West 
from Alexander to Putin” was kindly provided by Professor Kanet 
29 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.10 
30 Ibid  
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historical necessity for Russia to devolve further. Each new Russia consequently will formulate 
its own foreign policy that will reflect its own distinct needs and identity.
31 
The complexity of defining Russian national identity, in my opi nion, does not lie in 
philosophical broodings of its intellectuals but mostly in objective factors. The first set of factors 
comes with uniqueness of Russian religion and belief in its messianic nature. As a country that 
adopted Orthodox version of Christianity from the Byzantine Empire, a religion falling outside 
the mainstream of a world religion, Russia as o ne of the major Orthodox countries   used its 
religious uniqueness to define the rest of the Christian world as “the other”. By virtue of being the 
“true” Christian country, Russia therefore assumed the right to project its influence beyond its 
frontiers.
32 Therefore Russia assumed its messianic role that gave its state legitimacy for distinct 
national identity and regime. 
The second set of factors stems from the complexity of Russia’s identification with East 
and West.  By it geopolitical location Russia combines both Eastern and Western parts of Eurasia 
bridging  two  distinct  political  and  cultural  worlds.  Historically,  as  noted  by  Prince  Nikolai 
Trubetskoi, the important factor in the establishment of the Russian the monarchy and state was 
played  by  the  conquest  of  Russia  by  Genghis  Khan,  an  Asian  leader,  who  subjected  the 
Muscovite state to the rule of Mongol-Tatar Empire for centuries. This control by Asian power 
affected Russia both culturally and politically. In particular in terms of the construction of the 
state, as argued by Trubetskoi,
33 as in the case with the Orthodox Church, where Russia became a 
successor of Byzantine Empire, the Muscovite state  became a successor of the Mongol empire 
and continued its quest. Therefore, the Asian element played an important role in the formation of 
the Russian state and its culture. In addition, many ethnic groups that reside in Russia are from 
the East (Tatar, Bashkir, etc). This further contributed to Asian nature of Russian identity.  
Relations with the West have been an important element of the Russian Creed, as well. 
Peter the Great in the eighteenth century and later on Catherine II by force and political wi ll 
promoted Westernization of the Russian State. Exposure to the West did initially create an 
enthusiastic emulation of the West European model. However, Peter’s reforms faltered over short 
period of time, since he was working with the grain of Muscovite society, perpetuating, even 
intensifying its archaic feature
34 that was incompatible with more liberal Western model he was 
trying to implement.  However, if Peter failed to free Russia entirely of its old customs and 
institutions, what he created is a torn  Russia of the last three centuries.
35 Peter I constructed a 
state that did perceive itself neither as a part of Europe nor the country of the East, divided over a 
merit of its past and bifurcated into two social worlds.
36 Such confusion about Russian Creed can 
be seen in a gap between national identities exercised by Russian elite that was linked to extra -
national entity of the West and was not shared by masses on the popular level, creating a 
permanent schism between the identity of the elites and that of the masses.
37   
The third set of factors contributing to complexity of Russian national identity lays in the 
notion of Russia as an empire. In Russia consciousness of an empire came before idea of a nation. 
The early imperial expansion of Russia started in si xteenth century when Ivan the Terrible 
captured Tatar cities of Kazan and a few years later Astrakhan and incorporated the large number 
of people who neither shared the same religion nor spoke the same language as Russians. This 
                                                            
31 Ibid p 11 
32 Ibid, p 33 
33 Nikolai Trubetskoi, Heritage of Genghiz Khan, in Heritage of Genghiz Khan, translated from Russian, p 
307 
34 Robert Legvold, Russian Foreign Policy during Periods of State Formation, in Robert Legvold “Russian 
Foreign Policy in the 21
st Century & Shadow of the Past”, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 83 
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
37 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.3  
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resulted in formation of imperial identity in Russia before its national individuality.
38 Russia’s 
drive to acquire new territories and new peoples, the constant process of defining and building an 
empire, left establishment of Russia as a state and a nation in a state of perpetual change that 
consequently led to sense of incompleteness.
39 As a result the multitude of different ethnic groups 
with distinct languages, cultural traditions and religious beliefs that were annexed to Russia due 
to its expansionist aspirations further complicated the definition of Russian identity. However, it 
is argued by some scholars that the decision to become and empire was a reaction by Russian 
state to its almost constant state of war, since Russia “was invaded more often and with more 
force than any other early modern empire”. Therefore it was the logic of competition that made 
Russia wage war and forced it to expand its territory.
40 
Different aspects of conflicting Russian identity were employed by different schools of 
thought in attempts to construct different scenarios of Russia’s future and its role in international 
system. Ilya Pritzel, along with others, lists them as Westernizers, Slavophiles and Eurasianists. 
The ideological distinctions between the views of these three major schools of thought can assist 
in understanding of the shifts in the nature of Russian national identity after the end of Cold War. 
Westernizers put the emphasis on Russia’ similarity with the West and viewed West as 
the most viable and progressive civilization in the world.
41 The emergence of this school could be 
traced back to Peter the Great reforms. However, some authors argue that Russia’s deep cultural 
connection to the West began from the times it adopted Orthodox Christianity and became a 
student  of  Byzantium’s  faith
42.  Europe,  according  to  Tsygankov,  has  always  been  Russia’s 
“significant other”, figuring prominently in domestic debates and created the context in which 
Russia’s rulers defended their core values
43. Like Tsygankov Westernizers believed that Russia 
had always been an integral part of Western cultural mainstream, the separation from it happened 
as a result of Mongolian yoke.
44 Therefore, Russia is destined to return back into West’s orbit. In 
their core values Westernizers stressed the desirability and inevitability of individual freedom, 
legal  accountability  in  government,  and  greater  openness  to  the  outside  world  through 
international commerce.
45  
As a school of thought Slavophilizm emerged in response to Westernism.
46  Unlike 
Westernizers  Slavophiles saw Russia as   a unique civilization that combines the virtues of 
Orthodox faith, Slavic ethnicity, and communal institutions. They believed in messianic nature of 
Russia that was called to heal by the power of its example both the social divisions inside Russia 
and spiritual wounds of Europe ravaged by Revolution and War.
47 Slavophiles saw all of human 
history as a struggle between spiritual and material forces. Broadly speaking they argued that 
Russian identity and destiny lay in faith and family and in the spiritual institutions of rural Russia. 
They advocated internal change rather than imperial or hegemonic politics abroad as Russia’s 
                                                            
38 Ibid, p 177 
39 Ibid 
40 Unpublished manuscript by Andrei P. Tsygankov “Honor in International Relations: Russia and the West 
from Alexander to Putin” was kindly provided by Professor Kanet, p 23 
41 Ibid 
42 Unpublished manuscript by Andrei P. Tsygankov “Honor in International Relations: Russia and the West 
from Alexander to Putin” was kindly provided by Professor Kanet, p 3 
43 Ibid 
44 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.160 
45 James H. Billington, Russia in Search of itself, Woodraw Wilson Center Press, John Hopkins University 
Press, p.14 
46 Astrid S.Tuminez: Russian Nationalism Since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy, 
Lanham, MD/New York/Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, p. 63 
47 
47 James H. Billington, Russia in Search of itself, Woodraw Wilson Center Press, John Hopkins 
University Press, p.13  
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high priority.
48 Slavophiles supported autocracy as the legitimate expression of Russian political 
power, since it was founded on mutual trust between the sovereign and its subjects.  
As a result of the defeat in Crimean War and feeling of the humiliation Russian elite felt 
because of betrayal of European powers, panslavism emerged as an external projection of 
Slavophile ideas. In a nutshell, panslavism advocated for unity among Slavs with ideological and 
political center in Russia. Panslavs formulated their image in contrast to “the other” collective 
West or greater European powers.
49 They characterized Russian imperialism as generally benign 
by arguing that Russia absorbed other groups not with violent conquest but by advancing these 
groups’  interests  and  thereby  obeying  higher  laws  toward  the  establishment  of  the  ultimate 
civilization. 
50 Russian panslavs saw the purpose of Russian nation i n unifying all Slav people 
under one Slavic federation through establishment of strong state and enhancing Russia’s power 
on the international stage.
51  
Eurasianism or Civilizationism depicts Russian values as different from those of the 
West. The essence of this movement was in uniqueness of Russia. Eurasianists considered Russia 
more of a civilization rather than a nation. Such uniqueness they argued is reflected in Russian 
geographic, linguistic and historic background.
52 Their motto articulated by Petr Savitskii was in 
comparison of any nation to uniqueness of individual person. Therefore Russian nation does not 
have to aspire to be like others, but rather has to be like itself.
53 Due to its uniqueness Russia has 
to build its own different Russian -Eurasian world.
54 To preserve distinctness of this world Lev 
Gumilev,  a  prominent  Russian  philosopher  and  Eurasianist,  stressed  the  importance  of 
maintaining  a  culturally  non -threatening  union  with  the  Turkic  people  or  face  cultural 
annihilation inflicted by the Wes t.
55  As one of the important features of Russian identity 
Eurasianists saw in strong concentration of centralized power in Russia.
56 They argued that such 
state construction was inherited by Russia from nomadic empires, and in Russia everything is to 
be done from the name of the state, in particular its ruler
57. Therefore Eurasianists contribute a 
great importance to statism and see in it the foundation of Russian history
58.   
In their view of the West, Eurasianists are largely skeptical of its importance for t he 
future of Russia. They argued that despite West’s might in political and cultural sense Russia’s 
integration into Europe has always been followed by the sense of inferiority, where Russia was 
treated as European periphery with the sense of disdain from Europe to its European  backyard.
59 
The question that Eurasianists post therefore is not how to become like Europe and catch up with 
it, but rather how to “catch up” and “surpass” Europe and America, with the emphasis on the idea 
of “surpassing” the West.
60 
Despite  distinctness  of  these  approaches  all  of  these  schools  seem  to  have  common 
features on what constitutes Russian identity and what is to be present in social construction of 
                                                            
48 Astrid S.Tuminez: Russian Nationalism Since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy, 
Lanham, MD/New York/Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, p. 65 
49 Ibid, p 71 
50 Ibid, p 72 
51 Ibid, p 74 
52 Petr Savitskii, Eurasianism as Historic Design, in Heritage of Genghiz Khan, translated from Russian, p 
20 
53 Ibid, p 23 
54 Ibid 
55 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.230 
56 Petr Savitskii, Eurasianism as Historic Design, in Heritage of Genghiz Khan, translated from Russian, p 
24 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid, p 20 
60 Ibid  
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Russian  nation.  Moreover  even  though  they  originated  in  the  past  they  have  demonstrated 
considerable consistency in their analysis and historic continuity which makes them applicable to 
understanding  of  Russian  identity  in  present  day  Russia.    Following  the  language  of  Anatol 
Lieven, I would address these commonalities as Russian Creed, the notion that Andrei Tsygankov 
calls historical constructions of Russian Honor.
61  
I would argue that historically the first notion of Russian Creed is in strong Russian state. 
In pre-revolutionary times strong state manifested itself in Russia through Monarchic Autocracy. 
In Soviet times it was replaced by equally strong Single Party state with strong monopoly on 
power. In contemporary Russia this notion has been constructed in unique definition of sovereign 
democracy that according to Andrei Tsygankov, reflects distinct nature of Russian culture.
62  
The second notion of Russian Creed is in its spiritual freedom
63 or as I would call it 
ideology. Ideology has always provided substance to Russian national identity and unified 
Russian (Rossiiskii narod)  people. The messianic ideology of the third Rome as a feature of 
Orthodox Christianity got replaced in 1917 by equally messianic Communist ideology that was 
called to save the world from grip of capitalism and social inequality. One of the issues that 
today’s Russia faces can be seen in inability of its elite to construct solid and appealing ideology 
that would be shared by the whole population of the country. However the efforts of such social 
construction can be seen in notion of Russian Civilization, revived state strength and support for 
Russian and pro-Russian communities abroad.
64  
Under the third notion of Russia Creed Tsygankov lists cultural alliances of Russia that I 
see as Russia’s zones of influences or its geopolitical priorities
65. The definition of cultural allies 
of Russia changed in time. In Russian Empire, Tsygankov argues Russian state felt responsible 
for livelihood of co-religionists that resided outside of Russian state. Therefore Russia fought 
multiple wars with Turkey in part to protect the rights of millions of Christians within the Turkish 
Empire, such as ethnic Armenians.
66With replacement of Christian ideology with Socialist dogma 
Soviet Union was no longer committed to defending Christians or Slavs, and instead provided 
international  assistance based on socialism and egalitarian ideology to communism inspired 
parties and socialist states around the world.
67After the disintegration of Communist system, 
Russia went through various shifts in its cultural allies. While still the work in progress it includes 
countries that have historically gravitated toward Russia. The example of such redefined cultural 
allies can be seen in position of high-profile Russian official, such as former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Yevgenii Primakov’s support the idea of Eurasianism and enhanced integration on post-
Soviet space.
68 
The following tables of Andrei Tsygankov will further assist in understanding of the 
essential elements of Russian Creed and their distinction from Western values
69 
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Table summarizing some of Russia’s values in comparison with those of the West 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Part of the West                  Distinct from the West 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
1.  Christianity         Orthodox Christianity 
2.  Absolutism         Autocracy 
3.  Europe’s system of alliances     Special relations with the East 
4.  Social Democracy        Communism 
 
Table summarizing three distinct constructions of Russian Creed (Honor) 
  19
th century  Soviet  Contemporary 
Spiritual  Freedom/ 
ideology 
Orthodox 
Christianity 
Communist 
ideology 
Russian Civilization 
Strong State  Autocracy  Single  Party 
System 
Sovereign 
Democracy 
Cultural 
allies/geopolitical 
priorities 
Orthodox and Slav 
People 
Communist  Parties 
and Socialist States 
Russian  and  pro-
Russian 
communities  (with 
focus on former SU 
republics) 
 
 
The shifts in Russian National Identity 
In this part of paper I will demonstrate how Russia’s relations with the West influenced 
the shifts in Russian Creed after the end of Cold War. Andrei Tsygankov identifies four distinct 
shifts in Russian national identity in the last few years after the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev 
to power as the leader of Soviet Union.
70 
The first shift happened with initiation  of New Thinking policy that was a part of 
Perestroika  project.  As  an  autocratic  state  with  strong  concentration  of  power  in  highly 
centralized government Russia experienced shift in its internal and external identity from top to 
bottom. The essence of the shift was in Gorbachev’s ideas on Soviet Union’s relation to the West. 
With  the  Cold  War  the  world  was  divided  into  opposing  power  camps  with  two  distinct 
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ideologies and set of values.  Novelty of New Thinking was in its perception of the world as 
socially diverse and yet united by common human values as well as common fundamental threats, 
such as nuclear catastrophe, ecological devastation, etc.
71 The solution to the common world 
problems was seen by Soviet leader in cross-national communication and acknowledgement that 
national  interests  could  be  pursued  in  close  contact  with  other  members  of  the  world, 
predominantly countries of the opposite camp. For the Soviet Union this meant starting the 
dialogue with the countries of the West.  
Additionally, Gorbachev was looking to improve the functioning of domestic economy 
through closing the technology gap, revitalizing the economy and turning the Soviet Union into 
fully competitive global power.
72 Such idea of integration of two opposite camps was followed by 
active measures exercised by Soviet Union in hope of their reciprocation from the West. Such 
measures  included  disproportionately  large  cuts  in  conventional  and  nuclear  arsenals  and 
proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons, withdrawal from Afghanistan and aban donment of 
“Brezhnev doctrine”.
73  
The initiatives introduced by Gorbachev could be perceived as the beginning of the shift 
in Soviet national identity. Following the rational of Tsygankov’s Russian Creed, Soviet ideology 
was being replaced with almost utopian ideas of harmony of interests in international relations. 
Western states from the adversary in bi-polar world seemed to be transferring by Soviet elite into 
the  camp  of  allies.  However,  it  would  be  erroneous  to  claim  that  Gorbachev’s  idea  was  to 
completely  reshape  the  notion  of  Russian  national  identity.  Due  to  pressing  economic  and 
political  factors it could  be  argued  that  Gorbachev’s  motives  were  to  restructure and reform 
Soviet society without major changes in the core of Soviet Creed, such as preservation of strong, 
however  more  open,  state  through  single  party  system  and  maintaining  of  Soviet  Union’s 
geopolitical  priorities through alliance with Communist Parties and Socialist States.  
However, due to several internal and external reasons Idea of New Thinking was soon 
replaced with Idea of Integration with the West. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of new Russian state, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrey 
Kozyrev saw one of their essential goals to put an end to decades of Russian isolation from the 
West.
74 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the major power in bi-polar world, the only viable 
option for development seemed to follow the example of the powers that prevailed, the powers of 
the West. Like Peter the Great that introduced Russia to the West after centuries of isolation, 
Russian elite was looking to repeat his example. As Westernizers Russian leaders saw the future 
of  their  country  in  establishment  of  effective  institutions  that  would  sup port  and  nurture 
introduction of democracy and market economy to a new Russia.
75  
Russian President and his Foreign Minister emphasized desire for Russia to abandon its 
messianic ideology and become a normal great power.
76 The geopolitical priority of Russia n 
Creed  was  shifted  from  Socialist  States  and  Communist  Parties  to  Western  International 
Institutions and Western States, in particular United States and European countries. Russia no 
more exhibited interest in developing relations with non-Western nations either in Asia or in the 
                                                            
71 Ibid 
72 Roger E. Kanet, with Suzanne M. Birgerson, The Domestic-Foreign Policy Linkage in Russian Politics: 
Nationalist Influences on Russian Foreign Policy, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.30, no.4, p 
336 
73 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy Change and Continuity in National Identity, Second 
Edition, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p 221 
74 Roger E. Kanet, with Suzanne M. Birgerson, The Domestic-Foreign Policy Linkage in Russian Politics: 
Nationalist Influences on Russian Foreign Policy, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.30, no.4, p 
337 
75 Ibid 
76 Ibid  
 
13 
13 
Muslim world and quickly joined the IMF and the World Bank.
77It announced its openness to 
Western economic activities, but placed considerable economic restrictions on dealing with ex -
Soviet Republics.
78 In terms of Ideological part of Russian Creed Russia seemed to abandon its 
Soviet Ideological aspirations for desire to be admitted to the Western club.  
In terms of state dimension as defined in national Creed the country was implementing 
reforms that were called to introduce democracy into previously highly centralized authoritarian 
state. To sum up, at the beginning of Yeltsin’s Presidency there was a substantial shift in the 
notion  of  Russian  Creed.  It  manifested  itself  in  the  following:  firstly,  through  attempts  to 
decentralize  power  of  Russian  state,  secondly,  by  abandoning  its  messianic  ideology  and 
replacing  it  with  aspiration  to  become  a  “normal  power”  and  lastly,  through  change  in 
geopolitical focus from countries Russia had influence over, such as Newly Independent States 
and countries of the Muslim and Asian world, for the West. Therefore it can be argued that in the 
newly  emerged  Russian  state  the  shift  in  its  national  identity  was  caused  predominantly  by 
external factors, in particular Russia’s desire to become the part of the Western Community. 
However  the  enchantment  with  the  West  did  not  last  for  long.  To  some  extend 
unrealistically high expectations of the Russian leadership are to blame. Russian elite envisioned 
that their accelerated rapprochement with the West will result in blossoming of trade and massive 
financial aid. 
79 Western states as well contributed to the change in their relations with Russia. To 
start with the promised economic aid was not delivered due to West’s assessment that Russian 
progress in economic performance was unsatisfactory.
80 Internally, however, it was perceived in 
Russia that a former Great Power has been reduced to the humiliating level of beginning the West 
for minute handouts and caving in to IMF policies.
81  
Moreover, the changed in balance of power in international system left United States as 
uncontested hegemony and a number of actions that have been taken by the United States and 
other Western countries have prompted Moscow to complain that the West had tendency to 
dictate its own terms in international arena.
82 As Dmitri Trenin argues the West invited Russia to 
join it, but left the door half -open.
83 Therefore the project of Russian integration into Western 
Institutions was still born from its interception.
84  
There are numerous example of  such flawed integration. In case of NATO, while other 
former Warsaw Pact countries were being drawn into expanding West, Russia was offered new 
arrangements  but  it  was  kept  at  arm’s  length.
85  NATO-Russian  Council  was  supposed  to 
harmonize security agendas and to promote military reform in Russia. However it turned out to be 
a mere low-key technical cooperation workshop operating at NATO’s side.
86 The EU-Russia 
“common  spaces”  were  designed  to  “Europeanize”  Russia  socially  and  economically  and 
promote its political association with Europe. In reality however this agreement that was meant to 
enhance  cooperation  on  the  basis  of  greater  mutual  compatibility  offered  only  a  set  of  very 
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general objectives with no hard commitments.
87 Therefore there was a unified sentiment of deceit 
in dealing with the West in Russian society that was quite damaging to the image of the West.  
However, unlike New Thinking, and course for Western Integration taken at the very 
beginning of Yeltsin’s Presidency the shift away from Westernization in Russian Creed did not 
happen from the top, but was rather constructed by the whole Russian society. To start with, the 
shock therapy economic reforms that West seemed to support so strongly brought devastating 
results to Russian society. All indicators of Russian economy dropped drastically during the first 
three years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union
88.  It became quite common for Russians to 
complain that government policy of economic liberalization had more devastating effect on the 
country’s economy than did four years of the war against Nazi
89 – a shocking statement for the 
nation  that  lost  over  20  million  people  and  was  severely  destroyed  as  a  result  of  Hitler 
occupation. A survey of residents of European part of Russian Federation conducted only a year 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union indicated a change in public preferences from democratic 
euphoria to support for more authoritarian forms of government.
90 In the same survey 78 per cent 
of respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the political situation in the Federation.
91 
The frustration of the people was shared by Russian political elite, who either sincerely or 
in desire to capitalize on public dissatisfaction favored modification or complete rejection of 
President Yeltsin’s reform policy. Therefore it can be argued that Western policy of half-open 
doors to Russia, along with West supported economic reforms that humiliated and devastated 
Russia  contributed  to  the  unrest  inside  Russian  society  and  need  for  change  in  the  idea  of 
Westernized Russian Creed. 
Only after a few years of pro-Western policy whole Russian society seemed to mobilize 
advocating for the change in Russian national and international policy. This change has come in 
part with the appointment of new Foreign Minister, pragmatic and realist Yevgeny Primakov. 
Unlike his predecessors, Eduard Shevardnadze and Andrey Kozyrev, Primakov had no illusions 
about Russian integration with the West. As a committed Eurasianist
92, instead he concentrated 
his focus on re-establishment of relations with non-Western states, former geopolitical zones of 
interest of the Soviet Union, particularly China, Iran and India and intensified relations with the 
former Soviet Union Republics by drawing them into a tighter Union (Belarus, Kazak hstan and 
Ukraine).
93 In relation with the China Russia shared China’s vision of world politics and threat to 
a “multi-polar world” posed by the United States. In this regard if analyzed from the matrix of 
Russian Creed Primakov attempted to shift the concentration in its international dimension from 
Western states to former allies. However, many of Primakov’s visions remained on paper only 
and this contributed to the replacement of his vision of Russian Foreign policy and Russian Creed 
with the vision of Vladimir Putin. 
Putin  came  to  power  in  Russian  Federation  during  the  times  of  great  instability.  He 
applied a tough hand and reaffirmed preeminence of his presidential power over oligarchs and 
other powerful groups, proclaiming as his goals domestic stability and cooperative position in 
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foreign policy.
94 New leader had differences and similarities in his vision of international system 
with his predecessors. Like Gorbachev, Putin was mostly preoccupied with world’s instabilities 
such  as  terrorism  and  some  new  economic  opportunities.
95  Unlike  Primakov,  he  was  not 
preoccupied with unipolarity of the world but rather saw the need to engage West in joint 
projects. However, unlike Gorbachev and Kozyrev that started shift to Westernization in Russian 
internal and external policy mostly on Western terms, Putin visualized Russia as a great power 
and  sought  Western  recognition  of  Russia’s  regained  status.
96  Therefore  new  cause  of  Putin 
politics  was  in  redefined  national  interest  as  that  of  Great  Power  Pragmatism,  rather  than 
balancing United States power.
97 
In his policy Putin seemed to achieve what Gorbachev failed to do: he attempted to open 
up to the West but as a prudent statesman with pragmatic and driven by calculations state 
power.
98In his dealing with the West he offer ed the United States far reaching intelligence 
cooperation in aftermath of 9/11. Equally he was energetic in promoting of political and 
economic ties with Europe. In the former Soviet Union he abandoned Primakov’s integration 
project in favor of less costly bilateral relations. Putin valued Eurasian region’s political and 
geostrategic  significance,  but  he  replaced  purely  political  goals  with  emphasis  on  economic 
competition.
99 In re-establishment of bilateral economic ties Putin reasserted control of many of  
the ex-republics’ strategic property and transportation, in particular electricity and energy pipeline 
facilities.
100  Putin’s  policy  can  be  the  best  described  as  serving  the  purpose  of  modernizing 
Russia, rather than developing strategic diplomatic alliances or cultural affinities.
101 Therefore 
Putin’s  contribution  in  redefining  Russian  Creed  could  be  seen  in  replacement  of  ideology 
(Westernization  with  Kozyrev  and  Eurasianism  with  Primakov)  by  rational  pragmatism  an 
inclusion of Western and Eastern countries alike into the sphere of Russian geopolitical interests.  
However the honeymoon of Russia and the West was short lived in this instance as well.  
With  implementation  of  Bush  doctrine  that  openly  stated  that  American  sovereignty  was  to 
remain absolute and unqualified the relations between two countries seemed to shift more into 
realm  similar  to  the  one  of  the  Cold  War.  The  sovereignty  of  other  countries,  under  Bush 
doctrine, was to be heavily qualified by the United States, and no other country was to be allowed 
a sphere of influence, even in its own neighborhood. The clear intention of this policy was to be 
so powerful that other states had no choice but to join the US, concentrating all real power and 
freedom of action in the hands of United States.
102 Such attitude toward international relations 
with almost complete elimination of the notion of balance of power was predestined to increase 
tensions Russia experienced with the West.  
As a prudent international player, new Russian leadership was promoting its ow n 
political agenda in defense of its international interests. This position however was not welcomed 
by the United States. For example Russia’s technical aid to Iran has caused serious discontent in 
Washington.
103  Adding to difficulties was NATO expansion po licies and deployment of its 
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military forces close to Russian borders.
104 When Georgia and Ukraine expressed their desire to 
join the organization this added substantially to the Russia’s sense of strategic insecurity. 
105As 
well Russia was highly disappointed with U.S. announcement of its intention to withdraw from 
Antiballistic  Missile  (ABM)  Treaty.  In  the  words  of  Deputy  Chair  of  Russian  Parliament’s 
(Duma) Foreign Affairs Committee, “the United States has always followed its own political 
course and has such a dominant position in the world in every way. “
106 One of the most serious 
blows to Russia’s relation with the West however was in West’s support of color revolutions in 
the former Soviet Union Republics that have been perceived as highly destabilizing by Russia and 
directed against Kremlin’s power and security
107. Such support was perceived by Russian public 
and elite alike as direct encroachment on Russia’s geopolitical interests in its periphery.  
The frustration  with  the Western  policy  towards  Russia,  once  again, as  in  case  with 
Yeltsin was shared by Russian population. Seventy four percent of Russians polled in March 
2008  said  that  Ukraine’s  possible  accession  to  NATO  poses  a  threat  to  national  security  of 
Russian  Federation,  and  seventy  seven  per  cent  expressed  similar  feelings  to  the  Georgian 
membership in the organization.
108 
Russian domestic conditions have changed dramatically. Due to increase in oil prices 
Russian economy caught up and continued growing about 7 per cent annually – drastic difference 
after lacking economic indicators during first years of Yeltsin’s Presidency. Russian population 
became more financially stable as well attributing their well being to a strong power exercised by 
new  Russian  leadership.  The  economic  recovery  provided  Russia  with  stronger  and  less 
dependent voice as an international actor.  
According to Andrei Tsygankov Russia under the Presidency of Putin has not left the 
West. Tsygankov notes that Putin reasserted the West that Russia is moving in the direction of 
freedom  and  democracy  with  Europeans  but  does  so  at  its  own  terms  and  pace.
109  Kremlin 
ideologists constructed concepts of “sovereign democracy” and “sovereign economy”, by which 
they defended internally determined path to political development and indicated that the state was 
determined to have an upper hand in deciding conditions on which Western companies were to 
participate in Russian economic development.
110 Unlike Andrei Tsigankov, Dmitri Trenin is not 
so confident about Russia’s affiliation with the West. In his article of 2006 Trenin claims that if 
until recently Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the Center but 
still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left the orbit entirely: Russian leaders have given up on 
becoming  a  part  of  the  West  and  have  started  creating  their  own  Moscow-centered  system. 
Russia’s  approach  to  foreign  policy  has  changed  as  well,  like  the  United  States,  Russia  is 
essentially  friendless;  no  great  power  wants  strong  Russia,  which  would  be  an  unwanted 
competitor, and many would prefer to see Russia as a weak state that can be exploited.
111 
Trenin claims that substantial shift in Russian Creed has happened with Presidency of 
Vladimir Putin. Russia has started acting like the great power it was in tsarist times. It conducted 
its military exercises with China and India, welcomed Hamas leaders
112 and strongly asserts its 
policies in CIS. Based on Russian Creed description it can be argued that due to Bush doctrine 
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and its antagonistic policy towards the rest of the world, Russia in particular, Russian has yet 
again shifted the focus of its national identity due to the influence from the West. Firstly, due to 
outside pressures and internal political situation Russian President reasserted strong centralized 
power. Secondly, Russia re-established its ideology through projection of its messianic role in the 
region  by  getting  more  actively  involved  in  integration  with  former  Soviet  Republics  and 
assuming  leading  role  in  the  region.  As  Tsygankov  notes,  Russia-by  virtue  of  its  size  and 
capabilities- is seen by Russian leadership in a special position to greatly contribute to providing 
the collective goods of security, sovereignty, and stability in the region.
113 . As well a newly 
introduced idea of Euro-East, fusion of Western and Eurasian identities of Russia
114, adds a new 
dimension to the ideological part of Russian Creed. 
At the end it is worth mentioning however, that other factors along with Russia’s relation 
with  the  West  have  influenced  Russia’s  position  on  its  identity.  Among  these  factors  it  is 
important to note the newly emerging multi-polarity in international system and the rise of China. 
In  his  article  on  Modernity  and  Russia’s  chances  in  the  post-American  World  Dmitry 
Yefremenko argues that there are ample manifestations noted by important political analysts, 
such  as  Fareed  Zakaria,  on  decline  of  American  Century  and  approaching  of  post-American 
multi-polar world.
115 He notes that the new world opens the range of opportunities before Russia 
and they should be used to cre ate favorable conditions for internal development, and not 
complicating them in involvement in strict alliances. The freedom of choice author notes is a truly 
precious asset to have in the era of multipolarity.
116 
  The other important factor is the rise of C hina. The global economic crisis proved 
resilience of Chinese model that is increasingly looked at as an alternative to the Washington 
Consensus. The growing rivalry between China and the West appears as an inevitable clash of 
civilizations and ideologies.  The value of Chinese experience is mostly important to Russia. 
Comparison of historical experiences of these two countries provides additional arguments in 
favor  of  modernization  under  strict  governmental  control  for  Russian  elite.
117  China’s 
achievement  could  in  my  opinion  be  attributed  in  part  to  Russia’s  adoption  of  “sovereign 
democracy”  and  “sovereign  economy”  doctrines.  Chinese  success  is  changing  the  scale  of 
political values, since success and effectiveness stop to be unequivocally associated with liberal 
democracy only.
118  
  Following please find the table introduced by Andrei Tsygankov that can assist in 
explanation of Russian Foreign Policy after Communism. This table explains how interrelation 
between local conditions and behavior of Europe/West shaped different stages of Russian foreign 
policy. 
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Local Conditions 
  National 
Democratic 
Revolution 
Economic 
Depression/ 
Political 
instability 
Economic  Recovery/new 
security threats 
Behavior  of 
Europe/West 
Support  Integration 
with the West 
     
NATO 
expansion 
  Great  Power 
Balancing 
   
Renewed 
support 
    Great  Power 
Defensiveness 
 
Regime 
Change 
      Great  power 
assertiveness 
 
Conclusion 
 
This  paper  attempts  to  demonstrate  that  Russian  sense  of  national  identity  largely 
depends on Russia’s relation with the outside world, in particular the West. Shifts in the notion of 
Russian Creed consequently determine and shape Russia’s behavior as an international actor. 
Such  co-dependence  proves  the  importance  of  Russian  identity  for  stability  in  international 
system and significance of the relations with the foreign states to the notion of Russian national 
identity. 
  Importantly, both Russia and the West should draw lessons and rethink their approaches 
to each other. In my opinion, Russia should once and for all attempt to define for itself what 
constitutes its National Identity Creed. Constant shifts in search of acceptable paradigm are not 
only turbulent internally but present Russia as unpredictable and unreliable international partner. 
This can largely damage Russia’s international reputation. The key to lasting Russian identity in 
my opinion is in Russia’s unique balance between East and West. This equilibrium can be seen as 
a true advantage that allows Russian Federation to bridge and communicate to these distinct 
powerful worlds and cultures. It is imperative however, not to stress one side of Russian historic 
identity  at  the  expense of  the  other,  but rather  fuse  them  instead.  Russia’s strength  is  in its 
uniqueness that does not imply its destiny as an isolationist state.  
  For the West, it seems important to rethink the fundamental notions of its approach to 
Russia. As noted by Dmitri Trenin Russia’s transformations will not follow the course of Poland 
by means of its EU integration, nor should the West bank on historic shortcut in the case of 
Russia: no democratic, pro-Western Tsar will suddenly emerge from some color revolution to 
hitch Russia to the EU-US wagon.
119  Instead West needs to calm down and take Russia for what 
it is: an external player that is neither an eternal foe nor automatic friend. Russia will continue to 
change but at its own pace. Therefore it is very important for the West to understand and respect 
the notions of honor that drive the essence of Russian Creed and engage with Russia based on the 
notion of mutual self-interest.
120 
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